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ABSTRACT
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was
the subject of heated debate in the United States Congress.
The central issue of the debate was whether NAFTA would
have a positive or negative economic impact on the parties to
the treaty. This Article is a direct empirical market analysis
that measures the perceived economic impact of NAFTA on
the parties to the agreement and other states. The authors
use stock market event analysis to study the effect of NAFTA
on different sectors of the economy of the United States,
Mexico, Canada, Europe, and the Asia/Pacific region. In
doing so, the authors test the hypotheticalpredictionsof other
scholars and conclude that, contrary to speculation, NAFTA
has had no meaningful economic impact on the economies of
the United States and Canada, a strong positive economic
effect on Mexico's economy, a slight positive economic effect
on Europe, and a slight negative economic effect on the
Asia/Pacific region.
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**Hugh Roy Cullen Chair of Business Administration, Graduate School of
Business, Texas A & M University.
***Texas Commerce Bank Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A &
M University.

719

720

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVoL 27:719

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .........................................................

720

II.

EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS ............................................

721

III.

EVENT STUDY HYPOTHESES .......................................

724

A.

724
724
725
725

IV.

United States Economy ................................
1.
Overview .........................................
2.
Sectoral Analysis .............................
a.
Overview ..............................
b.
Firm, State, and Region
Specific Advantages ..............
B.
Mexican Economy .......................................
C.
CanadianEconomy .....................................
D.
Europe and Asia/PacificEconomies .............
EVENT STUDY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .........................
A.
United States .............................................
1.
Overall Market ................................
2.
Sectoral Analysis .............................
B.
Mexico........................................................
1.
Overall Market ................................
2.
Sectoral Analysis .............................
C.
Canada......................................................
D.
Asia/Pacific................................................
E.
Europe.......................................................

V.

CONCLUSION ...........................................................

726
730
730
732
733
733
733
735
736
736
736
738
738
739
739

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAPTA or Agreement) I became effective. NAFTA joins
the United States, Canada, and Mexico in the largest free trade
zone in history, a zone of 8.2 million square miles, 364 million
consumers, and approximately seven trillion dollars of economic
activity. 2 The Agreement represents an extension of the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement, 3 which became effective on
January 1, 1989.
1.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I. L. M. 289456, 605-799 (1993).
2.
See Nicholas Kublicld, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican
Environmental Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican EnvironmentalInfrastructure
Development, 19 COUM. J. ENVIR. L. 59, 60 (1994). See generally James
Gerstenzang, ExplainingNAFTA, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at A31.
3.
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 - Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). See generally Leonard Bierman et al., Effects of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement on the Equity Values of U.S. and
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While the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
sparked little controversy in the United States and was approved
with ease by both houses of the United States Congress, 4 NAFTA
and its ratification by Congress was one of the most controversial
issues in recent U.S. political history. 5 Spearheaded by Ross
Perot and the AFL-CIO, opposition to NAFTA focused especially on
6
its potentially deleterious impact on jobs and the environment.

The controversy reached a crescendo on November 17, 1993,
the date the United States House of Representatives voted on
whether to approve NAFTA. The outcome of the House vote was
uncertain until the last minute.7 Ultimately, the House did vote
to approve NAFTA by a narrow margin on November 17.8 Three
days later, the United States Senate approved the Agreement by a
large majority. 9
II. EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS

During the debate about NAFTA, an extraordinary amount of
discussion focused on the economic impact of the Agreement. 10
Would NAFTA economically help or hurt the United States?
CanadianBanks, 10 NW. J. INVL L. & BUS. 268 (1989) [hereinafter Effects of the
Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement].
4.
See Effects of the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, supra
note 3, at 268 n.3. However, the Canada-U.S. Agreement sparked considerably
more controversy in Canada where a national election was called regarding the
issue. Id.
5.
See generally Alan Wright, Comment, The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and Process Patent Protection,43 AM. U. L. REV. 603, 603-04
(1994); Kublicki, supra note 2, at 60-62; Kenneth J. Cooper, Democrats'House
Whips Cut Both Ways on NAFTA: Party Leadership Split Has White House
Scrambling to Rally Support for Trade Pac4 WASH. POST., Sept. 5, 1993, at A26;
Robert J. Samuelson, The GreatFog Over NAFTA, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 5455.
6.
See generally David Van Biema, Gored But Not Gone, TIME, Nov. 22,
1993, at 40-41; Eleanor Clift & Bob Cohn, President Clifflhanger, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
22, 1993, at 26-29; Rich Thomas, NAFTA: More Winners Than Losers, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 30; Gene Green, There Were Good Reasons for Opposing NAFTA,
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1993, at Cll; Andrew Le Page, Free Trade Pact Targeted
by Protesters: About 500 Workers and Labor and Environmental Leaders Rally

Against Agreement, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1992, at B4.
7.

See generally Melissa August et al., As NAFTA As They Want to Be,

TIME, Nov. 22, 1993, at 15; Clift & Cohn, supra note 6.
8.
See Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves U.S.-Canada-Mexico Trade Pact
on 234 to 200 Vote, Giving Clinton Big Victory, WASH. PoSr, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al;
Joe Klein, Standing Tall, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 29.
9.
See Helen Dewar, NAFTA Wins Final Congressional Test, WASH. PoSr,
Nov. 21, 1993, at Al.
10.
See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 5, at 49-50; Sen. Phil Gramm,
Leaving Mexico at the Alter, WASH. POSr, June 1, 1993, at A17; Sen. Ernest F.
Hollings, NAFTA is a 'Shotgun' Marriagefor the U.S., WASH. PoSr, June 14, 1993,
at A18; Gerstenzang, supra note 2, atA3 1.

722

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:719

Likewise, would the Agreement economically help or hurt Mexico
and Canada?
What about the impact of NAFTA on other
countries in the world? To date, there has been no direct
empirical market analysis measuring the perceived economic
impact of NAFTA. This Article provides such an analysis.
One of the best ways to gain insight into the economic
implications of regulatory changes such as NAFTA is through
stock market event analysis.1 1
This type of analysis involves
examining the impact of a given "event" on stock prices in various

markets throughout the world. This analysis assumes, pursuant

to the so-called "efficient markets hypothesis,"1 2 that all present
and future economic implications of given events are immediately
reflected in stock prices throughout relevant markets.
Stock
market event analysis is designed to measure the effect of an
event on stock prices independent of the effect of other factors.
To achieve this goal, estimates of the normal "expected return" of
stock prices are designed and then compared with the actual
post-event returns. The difference is referred to as the "abnormal
return" and is attributed to the given event. 13
In distinguishing between expected and abnormal returns,
event analysis focuses on two time periods: (1) the "estimation
period" prior to the event, during which a regression model that is
designed to measure the normal relationship between the world
stock index and the stock index of a particular state or industry is
developed, and (2) the "analysis period," which encompasses a
small number of days immediately surrounding the event day.
The market model version of the capital asset pricing model 14 is

11.

See generally Leonard Bierman et al., Denmark and the Maastricht

Treaty: A Market Analysis, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 147 (1992); Effects of the
Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, supra note 2; ROBERT C. RADCLIFFE,
INVESTMENr CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, STRATEGY (4th ed. 1994).
12.
See Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
Information, 10 INTL ECON. REV. 1, 12-16 (1969); SEHA M. TINIC & RICHARD R.
WEST, INVESTING IN SECURITIES: AN EFFICIENT MARKETS APPROACH 278-79 (1979);
Fischer Black, Implications of the Random Walk Hypothesis for Portfolio
Management, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 16; Daniel Seligman, Can You

Beat the Stock Market?, FORuNE, Dec. 26, 1983, at 82.

13.

Obviously stock markets will have general price movements regardless

of the given event. Thus, it is necessary to isolate the impact of the event from
the impact of other pricing factors.
14.
See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427 (1964). See generally
TINIC & WEST, supranote 12, at 278-79.
The market model was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) for the

period from August 2, 1993, through January 2, 1994. Because there was
considerable coverage of the deliberations in Congress over NAFTA, the
estimation period for the regression analyses ended ten days prior to the event
date. The individual indexes were regressed on the world market index. The
parameter JI represents a beta risk measure for a particular stock market index
relative to the world portfolio index. Based on the estimated market model.
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commonly used to estimate these relationships and is used in the
present study.
In this study, the focal "event" is the U.S. House of
Representatives approval of NAFTA on November 17, 1993. As
noted previously, 1 5 the outcome of the House vote was uncertain
until virtually the last minute. Therefore, the vote on November
17 approving the Agreement represented a significant and clearly
demarcated "event."16
This study examines stock market
reaction to this event in Canada, Mexico, the United States,
Europe and the Asia/Pacific region. Moreover, with respect to

Mexico and the United States, this study discusses the market
impact of this event on numerous industry groups.

prediction errors were calculated in the analysis period encompassing the dates
from ten days prior to ten days after the event data.
The table below shows the results of estimating the OLS equations for
Canada, Mexico, the United States, Asia/Pacific, and Europe. The B, coefficient
may be interpreted as a measure of the risk (or volatility) of the stocks in state or
region I as compared to the world stock index. A coefficient greater than 1
indicates that the risk or volatility of the state or region index is higher than the
world index, while a coefficient less than 1 indicates less risk. As noted in the
table below, the betas vary widely from area to area. The betas are over 1 for both
Asia/Pacific and Europe (respectively 1.63 and 1.09), but less than 1 for Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. The betas for the Canadian and United States
indexes are the lowest among the areas examined. The beta for the Mexican
stock market, or Bolsa, is higher than that of Canada and the United States, but
lower than that of Asia/Pacific and Europe. Most of the betas are statistically
significant. The R2 values are relatively low, implying that world stock price
movements explains a relatively small portion of the variability of stock market
returns in individual states or regions.
OLS Estimates For the Market Model
By Country and Geographic Region
Canada

Mexico

United States

Asia/Pacific

Euroce

OCI

0.00041

0.00153

0.00045

-0.00102

0.00089

Z1

0.27501**

0 .5 5 3 6 a

0.36361***

1.62725"***

1.0922***

R2

0.05

0.04

0.16

0.62

0.36

Statistic

* indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level
a This coefficient is statistically significant at the 11 percent level.
15.
See supranotes 7-8 and accompanying text.
16.
Id. See generally TIME, July 4, 1994, at 12 (chart noting numerous
journalistic citations of congressional "gridlock' during the month Congress
ultimately approved NAFTA).
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III. EVENT STUDY HYPOTHESES

A. United States Economy

1. Overview
Operating from the general premise that free trade creates
wealth, 17 nearly all scholarly predictions regarding NAFTA's
impact on the United States economy have been that it will have a

positive effect.1 8 Because Mexican tariffs on imports have been
approximately twice those imposed by the United States, NAFTA's
phased elimination of those duties should increase U.S. exports
over time. 19 Indeed, since Mexico began lowering trade barriers
in 1988,20 U.S. exports to that country have grown from twelve
billion dollars to over forty billion dollars a year, and transformed
a U.S. trade deficit with Mexico of over five billion dollars per year
into an annual surplus of approximately the same amount. 2 1 By
expanding U.S. exports, NAFTA should eventually bolster the U.S.
economy and increase overall employment. 22 Additionally, under
NAFTA,
U.S.
companies will
have
increased
business
opportunities in Mexico both in terms of investment and
23
production.
Nevertheless, while the impact of NAFTA on the U.S. economy
and U.S. companies should tend to be positive, the overall impact
of NAFTA on U.S. businesses should also be relatively small. One
estimate predicts that NAFTA will result in an annual gain to the
U.S. economy of six billion dollars, or approximately only one24
tenth of one percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The reason for this small impact is that Mexico-which has a
population of about 86 million people compared to the U.S.

17.

See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

THE WEALTh OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1976) (1776);
Kublicki, supranote 2, at 59-60 & n.1.
18.
See James Carney & Adam Zagorin, A Tale of Two Jobs: One Lost, One
Gained, TIME, Sept 27, 1993, at 58; see also Paul Krugman, The Uncomfortable
Truth aboutNAFTA, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 13, 16 (1993).
19.
Carney & Zagorin, supranote 18; see also Gerstenzang, supranote 2.
20.
These trade reforms were part of an overall economic reform program
implemented by Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari following his
election in 1988. See Kublicki, supranote 2, at 79-82.
21.
See Carney & Zagorin, supra note 18.

22.

Id.

23.
Alan M. Rugman & Michael Gestrin, The Strategic Response of
MultinationalEnterprises to NAFTA, 28 COLM. J. WORLD BUS. 18 (1993). See
generally Kublicki, supra note 2, at 81-82 (addressing Mexico's new policies to

encourage growth and attract foreign investment).
24.

See Krugman, supra note 18, at 17.
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population of about 250 million people-has a GDP of only about
$330 billion as compared with the United States GDP of about $6
trillion. 25 Mexico, which has an overall economy only about one
twentieth as large as that of the United States, simply cannot
afford to buy too much from the United States or to integrate a
26
substantial amount of U.S. business investment.
For these reasons, it can be hypothesized that the U.S. House

of Representatives approval of NAFTA probably had a negligible
overall impact on U.S. stock markets. If any impact did occur, it
should have been slightly positive. Moreover, the authors expect
that congressional ratification of the Agreement will have the
most positive impact on the industries that currently export or
have the most potential to export to Mexico, as well as on the U.S.
industries that have the greatest opportunity to invest in Mexico.
2. Sectoral Analysis

a. Overview
Obviously, some sectors of the United States economy will
benefit more than others from NAFTA. Some commentators have
predicted that the Mexican economy will be a "sponge" for U.S.
computers and telecommunications and will also soak up
automobiles, processed foods, and textiles produced in the United
States. 27 In addition, although Mexico has delayed opening up
its financial markets, 28 both Canadian and U.S. providers of
financial services should ultimately benefit from new access to
Mexico's huge retail financial market.2 9 In the United States,
various industries, such as natural-fiber broom makers, will be
directly hurt by the Agreement because NAFTA has dramatically
lowered barriers to the importation of this product.3 0 Other U.S.
industries that may be hurt by NAFTA include clothing
However, special phase-in
manufacturers and farmers.3 1

25.
See Carl T. Hall, New Trade Talks Open Today, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Mar.
17, 1993, at El; Samuelson, supranote 5, at 54.
26.
Ross Perot made the same general point in his exhortations that "you
can't sell things to people with no money." Fair Trade? Tariffs With and Without
NAFTA, TIME, Nov. 22, 1993, at 16. See Hall, supra note 25; Samuelson, supra
note 5, at 54; see also Krugman, supranote 18, at 16-17.

27.
28.

See, e.g., Thomas, supranote 6.
Id.

29.
See generally Making A Break For the Border,BUS. WK-, June 6, 1994,
at 104 (describing the Canada Bank of Montreal's goal to build the "first truly
North American bank') [hereinafter Border Break].
30.
See Thomas, supra note 6; Free Trade? They Can Hardly Wait, BUS.
WK., Sept. 14, 1992, at 24.
31.
Id.
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agreements protect other products, such as citrus and sugar, for
32
up to fifteen years.
The chart below provides an overview of recent, pre-NAFTA
leading exports and imports to and from the United States and
Mexico.3
Chart One
Effect of NAFTA on Tariffs for Leading Imports and Exports
Between the United States and Mexico
Mexican
Pre-NAFTA
Tariff

Leading U.S. Exports
to Mexico in 1992

1

Motor vehicle body

$ 1.3 billion

2

parts
Motor vehicle parts

$

1.3 billion

(other)
4
5

1
2
3
4
5

Oil , not crude
Radio-TV parts
Ignition-wire sets

Tariff Phaseout
Under NAFTA

10-15%

5 years

10-15%
I_1_11

5 years

10%
10%
15%

10 years
immediate
10 years

Leading U.S. Imports

Pre-NAFTA

Tariff Phaseout
Under NAFTA

from Mexico in 1992

U.S. Tariff"

Crude petroleum
Passenger cars
Ignition-wire sets
Color TV's
Seat belts

$ 809 million
$ 749 million
$ 657 million

$ 4.3 billion
$ 2.8 billion
$
15 billion
$ 112 billion
$ 711 million

0.5%
2.5%
0-5%
5%
3.1%

10 years
immediate
immediate
immediate
5 years

From the above chart it is possible to hypothesize, for example,
that the U.S. radio and television parts industry should benefit
immediately from NAFTA, as should Mexico's color television
manufacturing sector.
b. Firm, State, and Region Specific Advantages
In a provocative recent article, University of Toronto scholars
Alan M. Rugman and Michael Gestrin analyzed the economic
impact of NAFTA from a firm, state, and region specific
advantages perspective.3 4 According to Rugman and Gestrin,
certain companies or firms have particular competitive strengths
("firm specific advantages") that are influenced by political or
other advantages of being located in a certain state ("country
specific advantages") or region ("region specific advantages").35

32.

Thomas, supra note 6.

33.

These 1992 figures were furnished by the Office of the U.S. Trade

Representative. TIME, Nov. 22, 1993, at 16.

34.
35.

See Rugman & Gestrin, supranote 23.
Id. at 19-20.
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Rugman and Gestrin conclude that under NAFTA certain
industries in each of the signatory states-Canada, Mexico, and
the United States-will be strengthened and weakened vis-&-vis
the same industries in the other signatory states. Their "country
36
specific advantages" analysis is set forth in Chart Two below.
Chart Two
The Impact of NAFTA:
State Specific Advantages
Firm Specific Advantages

1
United States
High technology related
to defense; some

3
United States
Maritime; cabotage; steel;
agriculture; textiles.

energy.
Canada

Canada

Some energy.

Culture; agriculture.

Mexico

Mexico

None.

Energy; telecom. services;
natural resources.

2

*

04

United States
None.

4
United States
Apparel; citrus products;
roses; household
appliances.

Canada

Canada

Apparel.

Textiles; household
appliances; steel; beer.

Mexico

Mexico

None.

Most manufacturing.

In quadrant four of Chart Two, Rugman and Gestrin
hypothesize that NAFTA will create considerable new competition
from other signatory states for Mexico's manufacturing sector, for
the United States apparel and citrus products industries, and for

36.

See id at 24.
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Canada's textile and beer industries.3 7 They also hypothesize
that NAFTA will strengthen certain industries, such as the
maritime industry in the United States and Mexico's energy
industry, vis-A-vis competition from other signatory state
38
industries.
Rugman and Gestrin also hypothesize that NAFTA will benefit
a variety of industries in all three signatory states because of
competitors in states that are not part of NAFTA; in other words,
certain industries in signatory states gain "region specific

advantages."3 9

Among the industries seen as benefiting from

NAFTA under this perspective are the auto and auto parts
industries in both Canada and the United States and the
electronics industry in Mexico. 4 °
None of the industries in
Canada, Mexico, or the United States will be weakened by
competition from industries in states that are not signatories to
42
NAFTA. 4 1 Chart Three sets forth the complete analysis.
While the hypotheses set forth by Rugman and Gestrin are
provocative, they are also highly theoretical and speculative. To
the extent that industry-specific market data was available, the
study described in this Article empirically tests some of Rugman
and Gestrin's assertions from the perspective of market
participant reaction to congressional ratification of NAFTA. 4 3

37.

See id. at 24-26.

38.
39.
40.

1& These industries frequently are politically protected.
See id. 26-28.
Id.

41.
42.
43.

See id at 26.
See id.
See infra notes 77-82 and 90-98 and accompanving text.
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Chart Three
The Impact of NAFTA:
Region Specific Advantages
Firm Specific Advantages

1

3

United States

United States

Chemicals; computers;

Autos; auto parts.

trucking; energy; petrochemicals; agriculture;

Canada

electronics.

Autos; auto parts.

Canada
Chemicals; energy;

Mexico
TV tubes.

some forest products.
Mexico
Electronics; apparel.
2

4

United States
None.

United States
None.

Canada
None.

Canada
None.

Mexico
None.

Mexico
None.
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B. Mexican Economy

NAFTA should generally be a boon for the Mexican economy.
Under the Agreement, Mexican producers will be given unfettered
access to nearly 280 million relatively wealthy consumers.4
Mexican producers of commercial products-such as color
televisions, which will be afforded immediate tariff relief under
NAFTA4 5-should do very well under the Agreement. Moreover,
general United States and Canadian investment in Mexico should

markedly increase under the Agreement," thereby providing
Mexico with considerable new "infrastructure."4 7 Accordingly,
the construction industry in Mexico will likely be an early

beneficiary of NAFTA.4 Overall, it has been estimated that the
Mexican economy will be bolstered by approximately $6 billion

annually as a result of NAFTA49 -just under two percent of its
roughly $330 billion GDP.5 °
Nevertheless, as Rugman and
Gestrin point out,5 1 the rapid elimination of all tariff protection
for Mexico's relatively weak manufacturing sector may have

negative implications for this sector of the Mexican economy.
C. CanadianEconomy
The Canadian economy, which is about one-tenth the size of
the United States economy, 5 2 seems to be in a position to benefit
considerably from NAFTA. Canada currently engages in relatively
low levels of trade with Mexico. Annual two-way trade between
these countries totals approximately $3.5 billion,5 as compared
with the over $211 billion in annual two-way trade between

44.
See generally Kublicki, supranote 2, at 60 & n.5.
45.
See supranote 33 and accompanying chart.
46.
This development can be viewed as an extension of the Mexican
government's efforts since 1988 to attract additional foreign investment. See
generally Kublicki, supranote 2, at 81-82.
47.
See, e.g., Neal Templin, Detroit South. Mexican Industrial Belt Is
Beginning to FormAs CarMakers Expand, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1994, at Al. See
generally Kublicki, supranote 2, at 81-82.
48.
See Amy Dunldn, For Now, the NAFTA Game Is For The Gutsy, BUS.
WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 176.
49.
See Krugman, supranote 18, at 17.
50.
See Samuelson, supranote 5, at 54. See generally Stephen Fidler, The
Miracle Seems to Have Faded, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at II (providing the
Mexican GDP figures for 1992).
51.
See Rugman & Gestrin, supra note 23, at 24-25; see also supra notes
36-37 and accompanying text.
52.
See Neela Baneijee, Canada'sRecovery is Expected to CrossBorder and
Boost Business in the U.S., WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994, at A2; see also Materials
From Canadian Consulate General, Dallas, Texas (June 22, 1994) (on file with
Texas A & M Business School) [hereinafter Consulate Materials].
53.
See Consulate Materials, supranote 52 (amount in U.S. dollars).
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Canada and the United States.54 Canada also currently has a
large trade deficit with Mexico. Canadian exports to Mexico total
approximately $634 million per year, but imports from Mexico
amount to about $2.9 billion annually. 55 Although the figures for
Canadian exports to Mexico may be understated because of
56
significant "transshipment" of goods via the United States,

there still seems to be significant room for growth for potential
Canadian exports to Mexico and for greater overall trade between
Canada and Mexico.
The following chart outlines the primary current areas of
57
trade between Canada and Mexico.
Chart Four
Overview of Trade Between Canada and Mexico

1
2
3
4
5

Canadian Exports to Mexico
$ 100.5
Vehicles and parts
$ 83.5
Cereals
$ 55.5
Electrical Equipment
Seeds
$ 54.5
42
Paper and wood pulp
$

1
2
3

Canadian Imports from Mexico
$
1.2 billion
Vehicles and parts
Electrical equipment
$ 467 million
$ 435 million
Machinery, mechanical

million
million
million
million
million

appliances, and engines
4
5

Furniture
Mineral fuel and oils

$
$

202 million
179 million

Although Mexico currently exports approximately eighty-five
percent of its exported goods to the United States, it exports only
about three and one-half percent of its goods to Canada.58
Conversely, although Mexico imports about eighty percent of its
imported goods from the United States, it imports less than one
percent of its imported goods from Canada. 5 9 Thus, NAFTA could
open up the Mexican market to Canadian trade and have a

positive impact on the Canadian economy, especially in certain
54.

See Baneijee, supranote 52.

55.
56.
57.

See Consulate Materials, supranote 52 (amount in U.S. dollars).
Id.
See id. Figures are for calendar year 1993 and are expressed in U. S.

dollars.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
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sectors such as agriculture. 6 0 Indeed, Rugman and Gestrin
predict strong potential benefits to the Canadian agriculture,
energy, and other sectors under NAFTA. 6 1
Moreover, there may be various "indirect" benefits to
Canadian businesses given the new opportunities to invest and
produce in Mexico. The Bank of Montreal, for example, is
expanding its banking activities in Mexico in the hope of building
"the first truly North American bank."62 Indirect benefits to the
Canadian economy should contribute further to NAFTA's positive
effect on Canada.
D. Europe and Asia/PacijicEconomies
In general, NAFTA will probably hurt the economies of both
Europe and the Asian/Pacific states. Currently, almost ten
percent of Mexico's imported goods come from Germany and
France, and almost eight percent are from Japan.63 Under a
scheme of reduced trade barriers with the United States and
Canada, more of Mexico's imports may come from these countries
and less from Germany, France, and Japan. Similarly, about
eight percent of Mexico's exports currently go to Spain and
France, and about four percent are shipped to Japan."
These
amounts could be reduced under NAFTA. In addition, Mexico had
tentative plans to expand its trading relations with Asian and
European countries if the U.S. Congress decided to reject
65
NAFTA.
Moreover, as Rugman and Gestrin point out,6 NAFTA is
likely to provide "region specific advantages." That is, NAFTA may
provide advantages to certain industries in all three signatory
states over competitors from other regions of the world, such as
those in Europe and Asia. Thus, the ultimate approval of NAFTA
by the U.S. Congress would seem likely to have a negative impact
on European and Asian/Pacific markets.
One offsetting circumstance, however, is the fact that the
NAFTA debate was going on during the same general period of
60.
Both "cereals" and "seeds" are currently among the top five Canadian
exports to Mexico. See i&L
61.
See Rugman & Gestrin, supra note 23, at 24-28. However, Rugman
and Gestrin also predict that some other Canadian industries, such as steel, beer,
and apparel may be hurt by NAFTA. Id. See generally supra notes 34-42 and
accompanying text.
62.

See Border Break, supra note 29, at 104-05.

Indeed, the Bank of

Montreal seeks to earn at least half of its net income outside of Canada. Id.

63.
64.
65.
17, 1993,
66.

See Consulate Materials, supranote 52.
Id.
See Damian Fraser, Mexico Enjoys Few Alternatives, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
at 6.
See Rugman & Gestrin, supra note 23, at 26-28; see also supra notes

39-43 and accompanying text.
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time that negotiations were being conducted to complete the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The goal of the GATT negotiations was to achieve "freer"
trade worldwide. 67 At the time, there was considerable fear that
a rejection of NAFTA by the U.S. House of Representatives would
spell danger for the Uruguay Round. 68 As one observer stated,
"other countries will figure if the (Clinton) Administration can't get
NAFTA through the Congress, it will be difficult to get the
Uruguay Round through the Congress."6 9 Consequently, to the
extent congressional approval of NAFTA served as a proxy for
potential congressional approval of the Uruguay Round, NAFTA
might have a positive impact on European and Asian markets.
In addition, there is some evidence that European and Asian
countries might be more comfortable investing in Mexico since the
enactment of NAFTA because it assures their access to the United
States pursuant to the Agreement. 7" Overall, the net outcome of
the various effects of NAFTA in Europe and Asia is not entirely
clear.

IV. EVENT STUDY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A. United States

1. Overall Market
Table One, in Appendix A, sets forth the prediction errors for
the overall stock markets of Canada, Mexico, and the United
This table also contains aggregated stock market
States.7 1

67.
See Michael R. Sesit, A World Wthout NAFTA Sparks Concern Among
Analysts Mulling Consequences, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1993, at Cl.
68.
See id.
69.
Id. at C13 (Statement of Robert Hormats, Vice-Chairman, Goldman,
Sachs International).
70.
See Fraser, supra note 65; see also Geri Smith, Japan and NAFTA,
Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 55.

71.
See Table One infra app. a. For our purposes, prediction error is
calculated as follows:
PEi = Rnt- (&I + IRWt)

when all rates of return are in ex post terms. Prediction errors are tested for
statistically significant differences from zero with the following t-test technique:
PEt
SEit
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statistics for the Asia/Pacific and European regions. 7 2 Market
statistics for the United States are based on the composite "Dow
Jones Equity Market Index" as reported daily in the Wall Street
Journal.7 3 Because of the recent nature of the "event" analyzed
in this Article, relevant data was not yet available on computer
tape. As such, all overall market data had to be collected from
the Wall Street Journal.

Table One shows that none of the prediction errors are
statistically significant for any of the days in the analysis period
with respect to the United States stock market.7 4 In other words,
the overall U.S. stock market registered no response to the
congressional ratification of NAFTA.
Indeed, comparing the
number of days in which the signs of the prediction errors in
Table One are positive to the number of days in which the
prediction errors are negative shows almost a precisely even
split-a type of split that might be attributable to random

when

SEzt-

1(R+1) + n
n

n

with
s2 = the variance of the market model residuals in the estimation period; and
n = the number of days in the estimation period.
In words, SEIt is the square root of the estimated forecast variance for day r in the
analysis period. This test statistic has n-2 degrees of freedom and is Student's tdistributed. The null and alternate statistical hypotheses to be tested using the
equation to determine SEIt are:
H o : E(PEIt) = 0

Ha: E(PEIt) 0
"Event clustering" problems are avoided here by using portfolio results rather
than individual security returns. See Larry Y. Dann & Christoper M. James, An
Analysis of the Impact of Deposit Rate Ceilings on the Market Value of Thrft
Institutions,37 J. FIN. 1259 (1982).
72.
Id. See Table One infra pp. app. a. These regional statistics are from
the Wall Street Journal The Asia/Pacific statistics represent an aggregation of
market data from: Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand.
The Europe statistics represent an
aggregation of data from: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. See, e.g., WALL ST. J., July 8, 1994, at C-3.
73.
See WALL ST. J., July 8, 1994, at C2-3.
74.
See Table One infra app. a.
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chance. 75 The empirical result that NAFTA's ratification had no
impact on the overall U.S. stock market is consistent with the
hypothesis that NAFTA will probably have a minimal overall effect
on the United States because of the very large size of the U.S.
76
economy.
2. Sectoral Analysis
The fact that the congressional ratification of NAFTA had no
net wealth effect on the overall U.S. market does not necessarily
mean that the Agreement did not statistically impact certain U.S.
industries.
To test the impact of NAFTA on certain U.S.
industries, industry group performance data was collected for the
following industries:
basic materials (such as aluminum,
chemicals, and steel), conglomerates, consumer cyclicals (such as
airlines, media, and lodging), consumer noncyclicals (such as
beverages, cosmetics, and health care), energy, finance (such as
banks and insurance companies), industrials (such as factory
equipment, pollution control, and trucking), technology (such as
computers and semiconductors), and utilities (including electric,
gas, telephone, and water).7 7 The results of this sectoral analysis
are set forth in Table Two, Appendix B.
The results in Table Two's sectoral analyses are generally
consistent with the findings in Table One that NAFTA had no
overall impact on the U.S. market. In Table Two, there are few
patterns that would suggest that NAFTA had either a positive or
negative impact on the U.S. economy. Most of the industry
prediction errors are not statistically significant. Indeed, there
are no statistically significant observations in the basic materials,
consumer cyclicals, consumer noncyclicals, industrials, and
technology industries. 78
Moreover, for those industries with
statistically significant observations, the patterns are not strong.
Conglomerates, for example, have one statistically significant
prediction error with a negative return, but only eight of twentyone overall observations are negative. 79
Similarly, both the
energy industry and the finance industry have two significant
prediction errors, but one is positive and one is negative. 80
Interestingly, the only industry with any sort of clear pattern is
the utilities industry which, perhaps reflecting concerns over
possible Mexican competition, has two statistically significant
75.

See id.; see also Dann & James, supranote 71.

76.
See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
77.
The performance data was collected from the Wall Street JournaL For a
complete listing of industry components, see for example, Industry Group
Performance,WALL ST. J., July 8, 1994, at C12.
78.
See Table Two infra app. b.

79.
80.

Id.
Id.
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negative observations during the observation period.8 1 However,
contrary to the hypothetical observations of Rugman and
Gestrin,8 2 there does not appear to be any strong evidence that
NAFTA has had a significant perceived effect on specific U.S.
industry groups.
B. Mexico

1. Overall Market
Unlike the results for the United States, an examination of
the prediction errors in Table One shows that the U.S. House of
Representatives ratification of NAFTA had a significant effect on
the Mexican stock market, the Bolsa.8 3 Three of the prediction
errors are statistically significant, with two observations strongly
positive and one somewhat negative.8 4
The net of these
observations is .063598, or a positive 6.3598 percent. 85 If the
nonsignificant coefficients are interpreted as zero, the ratification
of NAFTA produced approximately a six percent increase
in the
86
wealth of the Mexican stock market during this analysis.
A similar conclusion is reached by examining the number of
positive and negative prediction errors for Mexico in Table One.
Unlike the results for the United States-and the results for
Canada, which will be discussed below-in which the positives
and the negatives are roughly equal, the positive prediction errors
dominate the results for Mexico. Seventy percent of the days in
the analysis period-fourteen out of twenty 87 -reflect positive
prediction errors. 88 This empirical evidence is clearly consistent
with our hypothesis that NAFTA would have a very positive effect
on the Mexican economy overall.8 9
2. Sectoral Analysis
The overall positive effect of NAFTA's ratification on the
Mexican stock exchange carried through to individual industry
groups. Table Three contains analysis period data for the
following Mexican stock market industry groups:
cement,
commerce, communications and transportation, construction,

81.

Id.

82.

See generally Rugman & Gestrin, supra note 23.

83.
84.
85.

See Table One infra app. a.
Id
I&

86.

Id

87.
88.
89.

The Mexican market was closed one day in the period.
Table One infra app. a.
See supranotes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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controls, food, and transformation. 9" Each of these Mexican
industry groups had statistically significant prediction errors,
with a total of twenty-nine statistically significant observations
across all groups. 9 1 Of these twenty-nine observations, the vast
majority-twenty-two of the observations-were positive, with
various industries showing net positive observations in excess of
the approximately six percent positive analysis period return on
the overall Mexican market.9
The construction industry provides a useful example of the

perceived positive wealth effects for Mexico from NAFTA. As noted

above, 93 increased investment under the Agreement should
prompt the need for new infrastructure in Mexico, which will help
the construction industry. Empirical results set forth in Table
net significant observations
Three confirm this hypothesis, with 94
totaling almost a positive ten percent.
Similarly, and in apparent contradiction to Rugman and
Gestrin's hypothesis that NAFTA may have a negative impact on
the manufacturing sector in Mexico, 95 Mexico's commerce
industry group also had net positive significant observations of
around ten percent. 9 6 Indeed, the only Mexican industries in
which the impact of NAFTA was viewed as somewhat uncertain
were communications and transportation. In this group of eight
statistically significant observations, five were positive and three
were negative. However, out of all twenty observations, nine were
These results may cut
positive and eleven were negative. 97
against the prediction of Rugman and Gestrin that Mexico's
telecommunications services industry would be positively affected
by NAFTA. 9 8
In sum, NAFTA's ratification had a positive wealth effect on
nearly all of Mexico's major industry groups. These results are
consistent with the positive effect that congressional ratification
of NAFTA had on the overall Mexican stock market.

See Table Three infra app. c. The authors are indebted to
90.
Intercontinental Asset Management Group, Ltd. for this data. With the assistance
of this group, which has an office in Mexico City, we analyzed period data for
certain Mexican stock market industry groups. See Table Three, infraapp. c.
Id.
91.
See Tables One and Three infra apps. a, c.
92.

See supranotes 46-47 and accompanying text.
93.
See Table Three infra app. c.
94.
95.
See Rugman & Gestrin, supra note 23, at 24-26; see also supra text
accompanying note 36.
See Table Three infra app. c.
96.
97.

Id.

See Rugman & Gestrin, supra note 23, at 24-26; see also Chart Two
98.
supranote 36 and accompanying text.
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C. Canada
Despite formidable hypothetical arguments that NAFTA would
benefit the Canadian economy, 99 the overall empirical results set
forth in Table One do not appear to provide much support for this
thesis. 1°
With respect to the Canadian stock market, none of
the prediction errors are statistically significant for any of the
days in the analysis period.1 0 1 Moreover, eleven of the twenty-

one days of the analysis period have negative prediction errors.l°2

Thus, it does not appear that the ratification of NAFTA by the U.S.
House of Representatives had any positive wealth effect on the
Canadian market.
D. Asia/Pacific
In contrast to Canada, the ratification of NAFTA did register
three statistically significant observations with respect to the
Asia/Pacific stock markets. 103 Two of these observations were
negative and one was positive-a net result of about negative two
percent.10 4
However, only ten of the twenty-one days of the
analysis period set forth in Table One had negative prediction
105
errors.
The possible negative impact of NAFTA's ratification on the
1°6
Asia/Pacific markets is consistent with the earlier discussion
regarding the potential impact of the Agreement on this region.
After NAFTA, Asian and Pacific industries will likely face greater
competition from stronger North American markets. Moreover,
Asian and Pacific companies may have greater difficulty doing
7
business in Mexico due to North American competitors.10
However, to the extent that the Asia/Pacific markets will benefit
from the Uruguay Round of GATT (in that the U.S. Congress'
ratification of NAFTA may be a harbinger of congressional
approval of the Uruguay Round), the negative effects on these
markets will probably be mitigated.10 8 In sum, the possible slight

overall negative impact of congressional ratification of NAFTA on
the Asia/Pacific markets seems reasonable from an economic
standpoint.

99.
& Gestrin,
100.
101.
102.
103.

See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. See generally Rugman
supranote 23.
See Table One infraapp. a.
Id.
IdId.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106.

See supranotes 63-70 and accompanying text.

107
108.

Id.
Id.
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E. Europe

The prediction errors set forth in Table One for Europe show
positive
observation-a
only one statistically significant
On an aggregate
observation of slightly over two percent.0 9
basis, eleven of the prediction errors are positive and ten are
negative.11 0
Overall, the empirical results seem to show that
NAFTA's ratification had a mixed or slightly positive effect on
European markets.
These results for Europe mirror the mixed or slightly negative
results for the Asia/Pacific markets and raise the interesting
question of why European markets reacted more positively to
Congress' ratification of NAFTA than the markets in the
Asia/Pacific region. Both regional markets will face increased
competition from the North American market as well as decreased
access to that newly unified market. However, the empirical
results suggest two possible conclusions: (1) European markets
will be less negatively affected by North American competition and
limited access to North America, or (2) that the potential benefits
to Europe from the potential U.S. congressional ratification of the
Uruguay Round are greater than for markets in the Asia/Pacific

region. 1

11

V.

CONCLUSION

Congressional ratification of NAFTA in November 1993 was
one of the most important legal, political, and economic events in

recent United States history. Despite extraordinary public debate
regarding the Agreement's potential economic impact, careful
empirical examination has revealed that the ratification of the
Agreement had no meaningful effect on U.S. equity markets either
on an aggregate or sectoral basis. Similar results were found with
respect to Canadian markets. In contrast, our empirical study
demonstrated that the ratification of NAFTA had a strong positive
effect on Mexican markets, with the Bolsa as a whole experiencing
an approximately six percent net gain in wealth. Moreover, some
Mexican industry groups, such as construction and commerce,
experienced net gains of approximately ten percent.
But while Mexico's markets soared in response to NAFTA's
ratification, markets in the Asia/Pacific region fell slightly, in part
because they will be facing new competition. However, markets in
109. See Table One infraapp. a.
110. Id.
111. See supranotes 63-70 and accompanying text. This latter question in
particular seems worthy of further empirical investigation. The authors are
currently conducting a study examining the impact of GATT Uruguay Round
implementation on various regions in the world.
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Europe, which will also face new competition from North America,
did not fall in reaction to the ratification of NAFTA. Indeed, they
experienced a slight rise in response to this event. The response
of the European markets-and to some extent the Asia/Pacific
markets-seems to have been influenced by market perception
that U.S. congressional approval of NAFTA increased the
likelihood that the U.S. Congress will ratify the Uruguay Round of
GATT.
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